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Constraining Charming Betsy: Textual Ambiguity as a 
Predicate to Applying the Charming Betsy Doctrine 
INTRODUCTION 
For over two centuries, the Charming Betsy doctrine has guided 
United States courts when international obligations and domestic 
law collide. The Charming Betsy doctrine has signaled to courts that 
when international obligations and domestic law conflict with one 
another, statutes enacted by Congress “ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains . . . .”1 Since it was first applied, numerous courts have 
implemented the Charming Betsy doctrine as a tool of 
statutory interpretation. 
Undoubtedly, Congress has the power and authority to disregard 
and abrogate international agreements by passing subsequent 
domestic legislation, so long as Congress demonstrates to the courts 
that it intended to abrogate the international agreement by doing 
so.2 Therefore, the Charming Betsy doctrine essentially “acts as a 
rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend to place the 
United States in breach of international law.”3 In order for Congress 
to rebut this presumption, Congress must provide the courts with an 
“affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate the 
international agreement.4 When such an affirmative expression of 
congressional intent is absent from the statute’s text, the statute is 
deemed ambiguous, and the interpreting court, in accordance with 
the Charming Betsy doctrine, interprets the statute in such a way that 
it remains consistent with international law.5 
 
 1.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 2.  Michael Franck, Note, The Future of Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy, 
Medellin v. Dretke, and the Consular Rights Dispute, 86 B.U. L. REV. 515, 521 (2006). 
 3.  Id. at 521–22. 
 4.  Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982). 
 5.  See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 
443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely 
reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights . . . .”). 
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But what does it mean for Congress to provide an “affirmative 
expression of congressional intent” to abrogate an international 
agreement? Unfortunately, courts have not provided a 
definitive answer.6 
Almost all cases that involve a conflict between a statute and an 
international obligation can be put into one of two categories. The 
first category consists of cases that involve a textually ambiguous 
statute that conflicts with an international agreement. In these cases, 
courts readily apply the Charming Betsy canon to interpret the 
statute in such a way as to avoid a conflict with the international 
agreement.7 A second category is comprised of cases that involve a 
textually unambiguous statute that expressly abrogates an 
international agreement.8 Courts are precluded from applying the 
Charming Betsy doctrine in these cases because congressional intent 
to abrogate the relevant international agreement is expressly stated in 
the statute and is therefore so clear and explicit that no “other 
possible construction [of the statute] remains . . . .”9 
Although courts’ willingness to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine 
to cases that fit into these two categories has received extensive 
attention,10 this Article presents the first analysis of the appropriateness 
of Charming Betsy’s application to a third category of cases. This 
“new” category consists of cases that involve a conflict between an 
international obligation and a textually unambiguous statute that does 
not expressly abrogate an international agreement. In other words, the 
statutes involved in this third category are unlike the statutes in the 
first category because they are textually unambiguous and unlike the 
statutes in the second category because they do not expressly abrogate 
the conflicting international agreement. 
This Article proposes that courts should not apply Charming Betsy 
to this third category of cases because Charming Betsy’s application is 
predicated on textual ambiguity. Because of this, there is no room for 
 
 6.  Franck, supra note 2, at 522. 
 7.  See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A treaty will not be 
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute, unless such purpose on the part 
of Congress has been clearly expressed.”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Kappus v. C.I.R., 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 9.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 10.  See, e.g., Franck, supra note 2; see also Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of 
Interpretation: The Use and Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339 (2006). 
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courts to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine when a statute is textually 
unambiguous, regardless of whether the statute contains an express 
reference to the conflicting international agreement. A textually 
unambiguous statute serves as an “affirmative expression of 
congressional intent,” thereby rebutting the Charming Betsy 
presumption. In essence, this Article contends that cases that fall into 
this third category should be treated the same as the textually 
unambiguous statutes found in the second category. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth the background 
to the Charming Betsy doctrine and analyzes recent landmark cases 
invoking the doctrine, including cases falling within the third 
category. Part II addresses three major concerns that arise when 
courts fail to strictly abide by the unambiguous text of statutes. 
Section II.A addresses concerns about the courts upsetting the 
precedential baseline upon which Congress legislated. Section II.B 
addresses concerns about denying ordinary citizens fair notice by 
depriving them of the ability to decipher a statute’s meaning and 
know how the statute applies to them. Finally, Section II.C addresses 
the separation-of-powers concerns that arise when Congress is 
required by the courts to include a clear statement in addition to a 
textually unambiguous statute to abrogate an 
international agreement. 
I. APPLYING CHARMING BETSY 
A. Background: Charming Betsy the Case 
The Charming Betsy doctrine began with Murray v. The Schooner 
Charming Betsy,11 when the Supreme Court confronted the seizure of 
the Charming Betsy, a privately owned schooner that was sailing on 
the open seas, by a U.S. military vessel.12 The captain of the Navy 
vessel seized the schooner under the authority of the Federal 
Nonintercourse Act, a statute that prohibited any form of trade 
between France and American citizens.13 Between the time that the 
Act was passed and the time that the schooner was seized by the U.S. 
 
 11.  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
 12.  Id. at 116; Franck, supra note 2, at 520. 
 13.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 77 (quoting the Federal Nonintercourse 
Act, ch. 10, 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800) (repealed 1801); see also Franck, supra note 2, at 520. 
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Navy, the vessel was sold from an American to a Danish citizen that 
had been born in America.14 The captain of the U.S. Navy vessel 
seized the schooner believing it was still an American vessel and in 
violation of the Act by engaging in trade with France.15 Even though 
the Danish citizen had papers that demonstrated that the ship was 
Danish, the U.S. Navy captain seized the ship.16 The Danish 
government contested the legality of the seizure, claiming that the 
ship was not American, and, therefore, seizing the ship violated 
recognized principles of international law.17 
When the case was presented before the United States Supreme 
Court, the issue was whether the “Charming Betsy [was] subject to 
seizure and condemnation for having violated a law of the United 
States.”18 The Supreme Court agreed with the Danish government, 
determining that the seizure of the schooner was unlawful because 
there was no reason to believe that the schooner was an American 
vessel within the meaning of the statute.19 In his opinion, Justice 
Marshall declared that “an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.”20 Applying this standard, the Court held that 
the “correct construction” of the ambiguous wording of the Act was 
that a vessel must be owned by a citizen of the United States “not at 
the time of the passage of the law, but at the time when the act of 
forfeiture shall be committed.”21 As the Court explained, “[i]f it was 
intended that any American vessel sold to a neutral should, in the 
possession of that neutral, be liable to the commercial disabilities 
imposed on her while she belonged to citizens of the United States, 
such extraordinary intent ought to have been plainly expressed.”22 
Over the years that followed, courts have relieved the tension 
 
 14.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 65–66; see also Franck, supra 
note 2, at 520. 
 15.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 66. 
 16.  Id. at 122. 
 17.  Id. at 116; see also Franck, supra note 2, at 520. 
 18.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118; see also Alford, supra note 10. 
 19.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 121–22; see also Alford, supra note 
10, at 1350. 
 20.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118. 
 21.  Id. at 119; see also Alford, supra note 10, at 1350. 
 22.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 119. 
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between international obligations and domestic statutes in numerous 
cases by applying Charming Betsy. Section I.B below discusses three 
landmark cases that demonstrate how courts have applied the 
Charming Betsy doctrine in a modern context. 
B. Textual Ambiguity as a Prerequisite to the Charming Betsy 
Doctrine 
Each of the modern landmark cases involving Charming Betsy 
involves a textually ambiguous statute that conflicts with an 
international agreement. Courts have routinely required that 
Congress clearly express its intent in order to abrogate an 
international agreement.23 The following cases demonstrate that 
applying the Charming Betsy canon is predicated on a textually 
ambiguous conflicting statute. 
1. Weinberger v. Rossi 
In Weinberger v. Rossi, for instance, the President entered into an 
executive agreement with the Philippines providing that Filipino 
citizens would receive preferential treatment for employment at U.S. 
military facilities in the Philippines.24 Three years after the 
agreement, Congress enacted a statute that prohibited employment 
discrimination against United States citizens at overseas military 
facilities, “unless such discrimination [was] permitted by a ‘treaty’ 
between the United States and the host country.”25 The issue that 
the Court faced was that the word “treaty” was ambiguous—did 
 
 23.  See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A treaty will not be 
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute, unless such purpose on the part 
of Congress has been clearly expressed.”). 
 24.  Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1982). This 1968 agreement was known 
as the Base Labor Agreement, U.S.-Phil., May 27, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 5892 [hereinafter BLA]. 
 In relevant part, Article I of the BLA provided: 
1. Preferential Employment.—The United States Armed Forces in the Philippines 
shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, except 
when the needed skills are found, in consultation with the Philippine Department of 
Labor, not to be locally available, or when otherwise necessary for reasons of 
security or special management needs, in which cases United States nationals may be 
employed. . . . 
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 27 n.2. 
 25.  Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added); Military Selective Service Act § 106 
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–129, § 106, 85 Stat. 348, 355. 
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Congress’s use of the word “treaty” in the statute refer exclusively to 
treaties found in Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution, which are 
“concluded by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate,” or did it also include executive agreements like the one 
entered into between the President and the Filipino government, 
without the advice and consent of the Senate?26 
The Court noted that if it were to interpret the statute’s use of 
the word “treaty” to mean only Article II treaties, the statute would 
repudiate the executive agreement obligation of the United States to 
the Filipino government.27 Accordingly, because the word “treaty” 
was textually ambiguous, the Court proceeded to apply the 
Charming Betsy canon and interpreted the statute in a way that 
avoided the conflict with the executive agreement altogether.28 
2. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. provides 
another example of textual ambiguity being a prerequisite to 
applying the Charming Betsy doctrine. The issue in Trans World 
Airlines concerned a potential conflict between a 1929 international 
air carriage treaty29 and, surprisingly enough, the 1978 repeal of the 
gold standard in the United States.30 The international air carriage 
treaty set limits on the liability that air carriers could incur for lost 
cargo.31 The liability limit for U.S. air carriers set by this treaty 
depended on the price of gold in the United States.32 In 1978, 
Congress repealed the gold standard,33 which had been used to set 
 
 26.  Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 29. 
 27.  Id. at 31–32. 
 28.  Id. at 32 (“It has been a maxim of statutory construction since the decision in 
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2L.Ed. 208 (1804), that ‘an act of congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .’”). 
 29.  Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation 
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted in Note following 49 U.S.C. § 
1502; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 245 (1984). 
 30.  Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 245. 
 31.  See id. at 247. 
 32.  See id. at 245. 
 33.  Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–564, § 6, 90 
Stat. 2660, 2661. 
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this liability limit for U.S. airlines.34 After the repeal of the gold 
standard, the Civil Aeronautics Board35 continued to use the last 
official price of gold in the United States to set the liability limit.36 
The primary issue addressed by the Court was whether the 1978 
repeal of the gold standard rendered the liability limitation set by the 
earlier treaty unenforceable in the United States.37 The Court 
determined that Congress’s intent as expressed in the repealing 
statute’s text was ambiguous because “there was no direct conflict 
between the treaty and the statute, so the Court refused to find 
abrogation given that the statute did not speak to the question at 
issue.”38 It was because of the ambiguous nature of the statute that 
the Court determined that Charming Betsy applied.39 The Court 
held that the treaty controlled the subsequent statute because 
Congress failed to “clearly express[]” an intent to modify or repeal 
the treaty.40 
3. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Roeder I) 
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Roeder I) is another landmark 
case that demonstrates that Charming Betsy’s application is 
predicated on textual ambiguity.41 As a result of the 1979 Iranian 
hostage crisis, the United States entered into the Algiers Accords 
with Iran, which precluded “the prosecution against Iran of any . . . 
claim of . . . a United States national arising out of the events . . . 
related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on 
 
 34.  See Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 248–49. 
 35.  The Civil Aeronautics Board is the executive agency that is responsible for 
overseeing the economic regulation of U.S. airlines. See id. at 245. 
 36.  See id. at 251. The price of gold that the Civil Aeronautics Board used was $9.07 
per pound of lost cargo. Id. at 245. 
 37.  See id. at 251; see also Franck, supra note 2, at 527−28. 
 38.  See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (OOIDA), 724 
F.3d 230, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
 39.  Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 252 (“There is, first, a firm and obviously sound 
canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous 
congressional action.”). 
 40.  Id. (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); see also Franck, supra 
note 2, at 528. 
 41.  333 F.3d 228, 237–38 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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November 4, 1979, [and] (B) their subsequent detention.”42 Despite 
Iran’s apparent immunity from civil suits in the United States, several 
Americans that were hostages during the 1979 hostage crisis sued 
the Iranian government for damages,43 and default judgment was 
entered against Iran.44 The State Department promptly moved to 
intervene and vacate the default judgment, claiming that the lawsuit 
was barred by Iran’s sovereign immunity that resulted from the 
Algiers Accords.45 In response to the State Department’s 
intervention, Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA) of 1976 and specifically referred to the case by its case 
number in the legislative history in an apparent effort to exempt the 
plaintiffs’ case from the Act and allow the lawsuit against 
Iran to continue.46 
The question that the D.C. Circuit faced was whether the Algiers 
Accords survived the FSIA amendments.47 Despite the apparent 
intent of Congress found in the amendment’s legislative history, the 
court nonetheless determined that there was enough textual 
ambiguity to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine.48 The court 
concluded that the required congressional intent to abrogate the 
Algiers Accords was not present in the text of the statute, and, 
therefore, it affirmed the order vacating the default judgment.49 In 
applying Charming Betsy, the court emphasized the amending 
 
 42.  Id. at 232 (quoting Iran–United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 
I.L.M. 223 (1981)). The Algiers Accords is an executive agreement signed in 1980. Id. at 231. 
 43.  The former hostages sued the Iranian government under the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 
 44.  Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 230 (noting that default judgment was entered against Iran 
because it failed to defend against the suit). 
 45.  Id. at 231. 
 46.  Id. at 235; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(c), 115 Stat. 748, 803 
(2001) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000)). The amended Foreign Service 
Immunities Act of 1976 stated that sovereign immunity would not apply if “the act is related 
to Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) [sic] in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia.” Foreign Service Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000). 
 47.  Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 235–36. 
 48.  Id. at 237. Although the court does not invoke Charming Betsy by name, the court 
nonetheless draws on the line of precedent that applies Charming Betsy. See, e.g., Trans World 
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (quoting Cook v. United States, 
288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982). 
 49.  Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 237–39; see also Franck, supra note 2, at 525–26. 
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statute’s textual ambiguity by stating that “the legislation itself [was] 
silent’’ on the precise point of conflict between the statute and the 
prior agreement.50 The statute was deemed insufficiently clear 
because it never specifically addressed the Algiers Accords.51 
C. Textually Unambiguous Statutes that Expressly Abrogate the 
Conflicting International Agreement 
Courts do not apply the Charming Betsy doctrine when the text 
of a statute is unambiguous and the statute expressly abrogates the 
conflicting international agreement. For example, in Kappus v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, a potential conflict existed between a 
section of the Internal Revenue Code and a tax treaty between the 
United States and Canada.52 An American couple resided and 
worked in Canada for a year and paid Canadian taxes on their 
Canadian-source income.53 When filing their U.S. taxes, the couple 
claimed a credit against their U.S. tax for all the Canadian taxes they 
had paid, supposedly leaving the couple with no U.S. tax liability.54 
However, the couple received a notice from the IRS informing them 
that the Internal Revenue Code limits the amount of foreign tax 
credit55 and that they were still liable to pay $6,152 in U.S. taxes.56 
The couple contended that the Code violated the terms of a tax 
treaty between the United States and Canada that required the 
United States to grant a credit for the entire amount of the Canadian 
tax that they paid.57 The court, however, determined that the Code’s 
language was an unambiguous statutory provision enacted after the 
U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty that expressly overrode any treaty 
obligations that conflicted with it.58 Because the conflict between the 
 
 50.  Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 238. 
 51.  Franck, supra note 2, at 526 (citing Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 237). 
 52.  Kappus v. C.I.R., 337 F.3d 1053, 1053–54 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  26 U.S.C. § 59(a)(2) (2005). 
 56.  Kappus, 337 F.3d at 1054. $6,152 is “equal to 10% of [the couple’s] pre-credit 
tentative minimum tax as recalculated by the Commissioner, who applied § 59(a)(2)’s 90% cap 
on the AMT foreign tax credit.” Id. 
 57.  Id. at 1055 (citing US-Canada Tax Treaty, Art. XXIV, “Elimination of 
Double Taxation”). 
 58.  See id. at 1057–58. The U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty was signed by the United States 
and Canada in 1980 and went into effect in 1984. In 1988, Congress passed the Technical and 
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statute and the treaty was irreconcilable, the court applied the last-
in-time rule and determined that the statute, being the more recent 
legal pronouncement, abrogated the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty.59 
D. The Problem Child: Textually Unambiguous Statutes with No 
Express Reference to Conflicting International Agreements 
Section I.B discussed cases in which ambiguous statutes were 
interpreted to preserve preexisting international agreements or 
treaties, and Section I.C discussed a case in which unambiguous 
statutes expressly overrode a treaty. A third “new” category of cases 
involves textually unambiguous statutes that contain no express 
reference to conflicting international agreements.60 
In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States 
Department of Transportation (OOIDA), the Owner-Operator 
Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA) challenged the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) decision “to exempt 
commercial vehicle operators licensed in Canada or Mexico from 
certain statutory medical certification requirements applicable to 
drivers licensed in the United States.”61 Federal law requires that 
commercial vehicle operators be licensed and have a separate medical 
certification attesting to their fitness to operate a commercial vehicle 
safely.62 In order to facilitate trade, “the United States . . . entered into 
‘executive agreements’ with Mexico and Canada for reciprocal 
 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act (TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100–647, 102 Stat. 3342, that included a 
provision that expressly stated that § 59(a)(2), as well as other specified amendments, were 
intended to apply regardless of any treaty obligation: “(2) Certain Amendments to Apply 
Notwithstanding Treaties.——The following amendments made by the [Tax] Reform Act [of 
1986] shall apply notwithstanding any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date 
of the enactment of the Reform Act.” Kappus, 337 F.3d at 1057 (emphasis added) (quoting 
TAMRA, § 1012(aa)(2) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 861 note) (2012)). 
 59.  Kappus, 337 F.3d at 1057; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 
599–602 (1889) (the Chinese Exclusion Cases); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597–99 
(1884) (The Head Money Cases); S. Afr. Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 121, 125–26 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). But see Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119–20 (1933) (explaining that the 
relevant treaty was not abrogated, because the Act, though enacted later, made no 
mention of it). 
 60.  Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 724 F.3d 230, 234 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 61.  Id. at 232. 
 62.  Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(3) (2012)). 
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licensing of commercial drivers operating across national borders.”63 
Unlike the American licensing requirement, which required a separate 
medical certification, the Mexican and Canadian licensing processes 
incorporated physical fitness criteria as part of their licensing 
program.64 In 2005, after the United States had entered into 
reciprocal licensing agreements with Mexico and Canada that allowed 
for the other two countries to continue to incorporate physical fitness 
criteria as part of their licensing program, Congress passed the Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act, which 
requires “all commercial vehicle operators” to abide by specific 
requirements that include obtaining a separate medical certificate.65 
The Act made no mention of the reciprocal agreements with Canada 
and Mexico.66 The FMCSA proceeded to propose a rule exempting 
Mexican and Canadian commercial drivers from the requirements of 
the Act, thus attempting to remain in accordance with the reciprocal 
agreements between the countries.67 The OOIDA filed a petition for 
review with the D.C. Circuit asking the court to set aside the 
FMCSA’s final rule that exempted Mexican and Canadian commercial 
drivers from the certification requirements.68 
The D.C. Circuit, in a split-panel decision,69 determined that 
while the text of the Act requiring “all commercial vehicle 
operators”70 to obtain a separate medical certificate was in fact 
unambiguous, the court would not construe the statute to abrogate 
existing international agreements “absent some clear and overt 
indication from Congress.”71 The D.C. Circuit cited Trans World 
Airlines, Weinberger, and Roeder I to support its decision.72 
Courts are not always this up-front about labeling a statute as 
textually “unambiguous” before they proceed to interpret the statute 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 233 (emphasis added) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31149(c)(1)(B), (d)(1), 
(d)(3) (2012)). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Judge Brown issued the opinion for the court, joined by Chief Judge Garland. 
Judge Sentelle filed the dissenting opinion. Id. at 232. 
 70.  Id. at 233 (emphasis added). 
 71.  Id. at 234. 
 72.  Id. at 234–35. 
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in a way that avoids a conflict with international agreements. Indeed, 
OOIDA was the first time that a federal appellate court had gone as 
far as to label the conflicting statute as textually unambiguous before 
holding that it must give way to an existing international 
obligation.73 This does not mean, however, that OOIDA is the first 
case of this sort. To the contrary, courts sometimes strain to label a 
statute that conflicts with an international agreement as textually 
ambiguous, even when it is not. The D.C. Circuit in OOIDA should 
be commended for tackling this issue squarely. 
One such instance of a court straining to find textual ambiguity in 
order to not abrogate an international agreement is United States v. 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).74 In PLO, a conflict arose 
between a treaty that the United States had entered into with the 
United Nations and the newly passed Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 
(ATA). The United States, as host country to the United Nations 
Headquarters, had entered into a treaty with the United Nations in 
1947 that provided that “federal, state or local authorities of the 
United States” would “not impose any impediments to transit to or 
from the headquarters district” of representatives of member nations 
or “other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United 
Nations . . . on official business.”75 In 1974, the United Nations 
granted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) “observer” 
status,76 and the United States accordingly permitted the PLO 
observer mission to set up offices in New York and Washington, 
D.C.77 In 1987, however, Congress passed the ATA, and in doing so 
explicitly labeled the PLO as “a terrorist organization and a threat to 
the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law.”78 
 
 73.  Id. at 234 (“But the parties cite no case of quite this kind: a textually clear statute 
with no express reference—or any other indication of its intended application—to conflicting 
international agreements.”). 
 74.  695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter PLO]. 
 75.  Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America 
Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.–U.N., art. IV, § 11, June 26, 1947, 
61 Stat. 756, 761. 
 76.  See PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1459. 
 77.  See John M. Rogers, Intentional Contexts and the Rule that Statutes Should Be 
Interpreted as Consistent with International Law, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 637, 651 (1998) 
(“There were only two PLO offices in the United States at the time of the ATA, one in 
Washington D.C. and the observer mission in New York.”). 
 78.  22 U.S.C. 5201(b) (1994). 
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The ATA made it illegal for the PLO, “notwithstanding any provision 
of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, 
premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of 
the United States.”79 
Notwithstanding this seemingly unambiguous text of the ATA,80 
the district court determined that the statute’s text was ambiguous and 
therefore the United States could avoid reneging on its obligations 
under the U.N. Headquarters Agreement.81 The court reasoned that 
the ATA did not expressly mention the PLO observer mission or the 
Headquarters Agreement.82 Furthermore, the words “notwithstanding 
any provision of law to the contrary” did not specifically say 
“notwithstanding any treaty” to the contrary.83 Even so, it is hard to say 
that the statute was textually ambiguous. 
II. CONCERNS THAT ARISE FROM APPLYING CHARMING BETSY TO 
TEXTUALLY UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTES 
Genuine textual ambiguity should be recognized as a 
prerequisite for applying the Charming Betsy canon of construction. 
In this Part, I discuss three major concerns that arise from applying 
Charming Betsy to textually unambiguous statute—whether that 
textual unambiguity is expressly recognized by the court or not. 
The benefits from and reasons for applying the Charming Betsy 
canon when ambiguous statutes and international agreements 
conflict are well established. By interpreting an ambiguous statute as 
to not interfere with a conflicting international agreement, 
Charming Betsy “eliminate[s] international discord in furtherance of 
an executive prerogative to comply with international obligations.”84 
The canon also supports the notion that “[i]nternational obligations 
are serious matters” and that “[t]he international reputation of the 
United States ought not to be jeopardized” when a conflicting 
statute can be interpreted so as not to interfere with international 
 
 79.  22 U.S.C. 5202(3) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 80.  See Rogers, supra note 77, at 650 (“[I]t is a stretch to say that there is any 
interpretative gap for the court to fill here. There is only in the most fictional sense an 
ambiguity as to whether the language [of the ATA] covered the mission in New York.”). 
 81.  See PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Alford, supra note 10, at 1342. 
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obligations.85 Furthermore, the doctrine serves as an indication of “[t]he 
judiciary’s respect for coordinate branches of government, to avoid the 
embarrassment of declaring a statute in violation of international law in 
the absence of a clear statement of repudiation by Congress.”86 
Although Charming Betsy’s application recognizes the 
importance of international obligations and protects those 
obligations from unintentional Congressional abrogation, applying 
the canon to cases involving textually unambiguous statutes raises 
three serious concerns. The first is that requiring a clear statement 
from Congress in addition to unambiguous statutory text in order to 
abrogate an international obligation upsets the baseline upon which 
Congress legislated. This is akin to the courts changing the rule in 
the middle of a game, undoing whatever deals and bargains were 
made internally within the legislature to enact the statute. The 
second concern that arises from applying Charming Betsy to a 
statute’s unambiguous text is that doing so deprives ordinary citizens 
of fair notice of the law and prevents them from understanding 
which laws apply to them. By abiding to the unambiguous text of a 
statute, courts can promote a more predictable judicial system where 
citizens can reliably act without fear of personal liability and with 
confidence in their business decisions. Finally, requiring a clear 
statement when the statute’s text is unambiguous interferes with the 
separation of powers between the judiciary and the other two 
branches of federal government, thereby potentially leading to the 
encroachment of personal liberties. 
A. Concerns about Upsetting the Precedential Baseline 
When Congress legislates, it does so against a predictable 
baseline established by court precedent. As Congress creates new 
laws, it expects federal courts to interpret those laws in a manner that 
is consistent with past interpretation. With regards to international 
agreements, Congress is presumably operating against the 
background assumption that, according to federal court precedent, 
the Charming Betsy doctrine will only be applied to a statute in order 
to avoid abrogating an international agreement when the statute is 
 
 85.  Franck, supra note 2, at 528. 
 86.  Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic 
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (1990). 
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textually ambiguous.87 If a court were to apply Charming Betsy in a 
situation where the text of the conflicting statute is unambiguous, the 
court would upset and contradict the baseline precedent upon which 
Congress framed and passed its legislation. If the courts truly wish to 
change the rules mid-game, they should do so only prospectively, 
thereby communicating to Congress that the baseline has changed 
and allow the legislature to act accordingly in the future. 
Cannon v. University of Chicago88 serves as an illustration of the 
appropriate way for courts to change the rules mid-game. In 
Cannon, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a private 
right to sue for an alleged Title IX claim.89 Justice Rehnquist, who 
typically disfavored determining that such implied private rights of 
action existed,90 stated in his concurring opinion that he was willing 
to side with the majority because, at the time that Congress had 
enacted Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, “the legislature had 
generally assumed that courts would decide whether a civil rights 
statute contained an implied private right of action.”91 In other 
words, Justice Rehnquist recognized that Congress took into 
account and relied upon the baseline that courts could, and often 
would, determine that various civil rights statutes contained an 
implied right of action. Because of this reliance, Congress did not see 
a need to explicitly state in this context whether a private right of 
action existed.92 
Although Justice Rehnquist was willing to find that a judicially 
inferred private right of action existed in Cannon, he made a special 
point of noting that, going forward, the Court would change 
 
 87.  See supra Section I.B. 
 88.  441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 89.  Id. at 689. 
 90.  See id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing against liberal judicial 
implication of private rights of action and that courts should encourage Congress to explicitly 
state whether it intends to authorize such rights); see also Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: 
Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 869 (2002). 
 91.  Mank, supra note 90, at 849–50 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718). 
 92.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (“Cases such as J.I. Case Co. v. Borak . . . and 
numerous cases from other federal courts, gave Congress good reason to think that the federal 
judiciary would undertake this task.”). 
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course.93 Justice Rehnquist warned Congress that it would no longer 
be sufficient to rely on the courts to determine whether there would 
be private rights of action, and that the legislature itself must directly 
confront the issue.94 If Congress wished to provide for private rights 
to sue for violations of statutorily defined duties in the future, 
Congress must explicitly provide for such rights.95 Justice Rehnquist 
commented that after Congress was put on notice by his opinion, 
“the ball, so to speak, may well now be in [Congress’s] court.”96 
Because it was put on notice, Congress could then “take this 
changed legal climate into account and its failure to expressly 
mention a private right of action in statutes subsequently enacted 
will reflect a conscious decision that it not exist.”97 
By applying the Charming Betsy canon to textually unambiguous 
statutes, courts are changing the rules mid-game and upsetting the 
precedential baseline upon which Congress enacted the statute. The 
clear precedent that has been established by the courts creates the 
baseline that Charming Betsy’s application is predicated on textual 
ambiguity. When Congress passes a textually unambiguous statute, the 
established baseline justifiably results in Congress’s expectation that 
the statute would abrogate a conflicting treaty because the statute is 
textually unambiguous. When courts subsequently choose to upset 
that baseline retroactively and require that Congress provide a clear 
statement that expressly abrogates the international agreement in 
addition to unambiguous text, courts undo any and all of Congress’s 
bargains that were in place when the statute was passed.98 
Whether or not it would have been a good rule at the outset for 
courts to require such a clear statement when the text of a statute is 
unambiguous is wholly irrelevant—the reality remains that upsetting 
the baseline upon which Congress legislates carries with it the 
 
 93.  Sure enough, in later decisions following Cannon, the view of Justice Rehnquist 
carried a majority of the Court. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 
560, 561–62. 
 94.  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of 
Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J. 211, 254 (1983). 
 98.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540–41 
(1983) (discussing how legislation is best understood as the result of compromises). 
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consequence of undermining the intent and expectations of 
Congress. Although Justice Rehnquist would have likely preferred 
that Congress had not originally left it to the courts to determine 
whether implied private rights of action existed in civil rights cases at 
the outset, he recognized that such precedent did exist and that 
there is danger in upsetting the baseline upon which Congress 
legislated without first giving Congress notice of the change.99 Only 
after Justice Rehnquist provided notice to Congress that it would be 
required to expressly state whether it intended to create a private 
right of action was Congress held to that standard. 
If courts wish to require Congress to provide a clear statement in 
which it must expressly abrogate an existing treaty regardless of 
textual unambiguity, then courts should exercise constraint and do 
so only prospectively and after clear notice is given to Congress that 
such will be the courts’ course of action moving forward. Doing so 
will be in line with the principle established by Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurring opinion in Cannon, properly provide Congress with the 
appropriate notice, and alert it to the fact that the baseline is 
changing prospectively. 
B. Concerns about Denying Citizens Fair Notice of the Law 
When courts interpret a statute to mean something other than 
the plain meaning of the statute’s unambiguous text, they deprive 
ordinary citizens of the ability to decipher the statute’s meaning and 
know how the statute applies to them. Although the benefits that 
result from promoting textualism have been documented in other 
contexts,100 significant benefits also result from abiding by the 
unambiguous text of a statute in the context of situations where 
statutes and international agreements conflict. If a statute’s text is 
unambiguous, and that statute conflicts with an international 
agreement, courts should abide by that unambiguous text in order 
to give citizens fair notice of the law. 
 
 99.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (holding that an implied 
private right of action exists while arguing against liberal judicial implication of private rights of 
action and that courts should, going forward, encourage Congress to explicitly state whether it 
intends to authorize such rights). 
 100.  See, e.g., Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542 (2009). 
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Giving citizens fair notice of what the law is and how it applies to 
them is “an essential element of the rule of law” and promotes 
“fairness, legitimacy, and social utility.”101 When citizens have notice 
of the laws and know whether those laws are applicable to them, 
social efficiency increases and citizens are better able “to order their 
behavior within an established legal framework.”102 Furthermore, 
citizens become “more confident taking the business risks that drive 
our economy” because they “are confident that they are aware of the 
applicable laws.”103 On the other hand, if courts interpret statutes in 
a way that is inconsistent with the plain meaning of their text, 
citizens would be inclined to view the legal system as unpredictable 
and believe that they are unable to determine what a law means by 
just reading its text.104 This is problematic because “an unpredictable 
legal system can place severe limits on productivity and perpetrate 
immense injustice against well-meaning individuals”105 that take 
action thinking that they know what a textually unambiguous statute 
means, only to learn later courts have interpreted the statute to mean 
something entirely different. 
When a statute’s text is unambiguous on its face, courts cannot 
expect ordinary citizens to parse through the legislative history of a 
statute or strain to find ambiguity in order to understand the 
meaning of a statute. Indeed, by definition, the word 
“unambiguous” suggests that the text is not open to more than one 
interpretation;106 therefore, an ordinary citizen would read the text of 
a textually unambiguous statute and not think that an appeal to 
extrinsic sources is necessary. 
Courts should first look at the plain text of the statute and 
determine whether the plain meaning of the text unambiguously 
 
 101.  Id. at 543. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989) (“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the 
Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of 
knowing what it prescribes. . . . As laws have become more numerous, and as people have 
become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in the courts, we can less and less afford 
protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may mean.”). 
 105.  Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 551. 
 106.  Unambiguous: “[H]aving or being a single clearly defined or stated meaning.” 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2482 (1993). 
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contradicts an international agreement. If it does, then courts should 
“stop[] there and appl[y] the text according to that clear 
meaning.”107 Doing so would ensure that courts “reach the 
interpretation of the text that most accurately reflects how citizens 
would understand it,”108 thereby interpreting the statute in the way 
that the citizens that are subject to the statute would fairly expect 
it to apply.109 
It is true that canons of construction, such as the Charming Betsy 
doctrine, “facilitate fair notice in a more general way [b]y 
establishing predictable, objective rules for interpreting statutes.”110 
But using a canon of construction is appropriate only when there is 
textual ambiguity.111 When the text of a statute is unambiguous, a 
court’s application of a canon of construction such as Charming 
Betsy is likely to lead to more confusion rather than providing the 
ordinary citizen with fair notice by establishing a predictable, 
objective rule. This is especially true in situations where applying the 
canon of construction leads the court to reach the exact opposite 
conclusion about the statute that an ordinary citizen would reach by 
simply reading the statute’s text. 
For example, an ordinary citizen that reads a federal statute that 
requires “all commercial vehicle operators” to abide by a specific 
medical requirement112 is almost certainty going to reach the 
conclusion that the medical requirement statutorily applies to all 
commercial vehicle operators, irrespective of national origin or any 
other factors because that is what the text of statute plainly says. The 
statute says “all,” so the ordinary citizen reader would have no 
reason to think the statute meant anything other than “all.” Even 
 
 107.  Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 558. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 17 (1960) (noting that all laws should be predictable to their subjects). 
 110.  Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 560. 
 111.  See generally Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral: A Defense of Substantive 
Canons of Construction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 915 (2001) (encouraging judges to implement 
substantive canons of construction when statutes’ text are ambiguous); see also Textualism as 
Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 559 (“[W]hen ambiguity cannot be resolved by the use of 
definitional tools or simple attention to context, the textualist turns to traditional 
canons of construction.”). 
 112.  Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 724 F.3d 230, 233 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). 
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though the court interpreting this statute expressly stated that the 
text was “unambiguous,”113 the court proceeded to deviate from that 
unambiguous text by implicitly applying the Charming Betsy canon 
of construction and ultimately holding that, by saying “all 
commercial vehicle operators,” the legislature really must have meant 
“all commercial vehicle operators besides those that operate out of 
Mexico and Canada.”114 An ordinary citizen would not have thought 
to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine115 because the text of the 
statute in this situation was clear and unambiguous. 
Applying Charming Betsy when the text of a statute is 
unambiguous deprives ordinary citizens of fair notice, undermines 
their ability to apply the law for themselves, and decreases the legal 
literacy of the general public. On the other hand, faithful adherence 
to the legislature’s commands as unambiguously expressed through 
the text of statutes “ensures that parties to a suit will be bound by 
the law as they would have reasonably interpreted it.”116 Abiding by 
the unambiguous text of statutes promotes fair notice to citizens, 
which in turn promotes a system in which judicial interpretation is 
more predictable.117 A more predictable judicial system has high 
social utility because it promotes fundamental fairness and equality. 
As a result of a predictable judicial system that promotes these 
values, “citizens can reliably act without fear of personal liability and 
with confidence in their business decisions.”118 
C. Separation of Power Concerns 
The Supreme Court has stated, “[T]he separation of 
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to 
the preservation of liberty.”119 There has always existed a “hydraulic 
 
 113.  Id. at 234. 
 114.  Id. at 236–38. 
 115.  This is assuming, of course, that an ordinary citizen even knows what the 
Charming Betsy canon of construction is, which he or she almost certainly would not. This 
even further bolsters the argument that, in situations when the text of a statute is unambiguous 
and it conflicts with an international agreement, courts should abide by the unambiguous text 
because that is what the ordinary citizen can know and familiarize him or herself with. 
 116.  Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 562. 
 117.  Id. at 563. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
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pressure” within each of the three branches of government to exceed 
their constitutional limits and encroach upon the powers of the other 
branches.120 Although the separation-of-powers doctrine is not 
explicitly set forth in the Constitution, it “is nonetheless deeply 
rooted in the Constitution and is designed to prevent the 
‘commingling’ of the various powers of the government.”121 It is 
therefore vital that the separation of powers be maintained. 
Requiring Congress to provide a clear statement, in addition to 
unambiguous statutory text, in order to abrogate an international 
agreement interferes with the separation of powers between the 
judicial, executive, and legislative branches. In implementing this 
heightened clear statement requirement in the context of executive 
agreements, the judiciary is essentially siding with the executive 
branch because it increases the burden placed on Congress of what it 
must do to abrogate an executive agreement. 
This separation-of-powers concern is magnified when the 
international agreement is an executive agreement and not a treaty. 
While treaties are entered into pursuant to the Constitution’s Treaty 
Clause,122 executive agreements can be entered into by relatively low-
ranking members of the executive branch.123 “If ‘[d]istorting 
statutory language simply to avoid conflicts with treaties would 
elevate treaties above statutes in contravention of the Constitution,’ 
distorting statutory language to avoid conflicts with international 
[executive] agreements even more obviously contravenes 
the Constitution.”124 
 
 120.  See Jamil Jaffer, Comment, Congressional Control over Treaty Interpretation, 70 U. 
CHI L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2003) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). 
 121.  Id. at 1097 (quoting O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933)). 
 122.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President “Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided that two thirds of the Senators 
present concur”). 
 123.  For example, in OOIDA, the executive agreement with Mexico was made between 
the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and the Mexican Secretary of Communications and 
Transportation, and the agreement with Canada was entered into as a result of letters 
exchanged between “two transportation bureaucrats in the United States and Canada.” See 
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (OOIDA), 724 F.3d 230, 241 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
 124.  OOIDA, 724 F.3d at 241 (quoting Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 
F.3d 872, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
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The choice of whether to renege on a promise made in an 
international agreement is a choice best left to the political branches 
of government, not the judiciary.125 The Supreme Court has stated 
that the choice to act in direct contravention of a treaty or 
international agreement “belong[s] to diplomacy and legislation, and 
not to the administration of the laws.”126 Indeed, it is entirely within 
Congress’s authority to abrogate or rescind international 
agreements, and “[t]he political considerations that must be 
balanced prior to such a decision are beyond both the expertise and 
mandate of [the courts].”127 Therefore, it is inappropriate for the 
courts to second-guess Congress’s decision to abrogate an 
international agreement if the abrogating statute’s text is 
unambiguous. Second-guessing Congress’s action interferes with the 
legislature’s constitutionally sanctioned ability to abrogate such 
agreements and risks putting a court in a position where it is making 
a diplomatic policy decision. 
Although courts are sometimes asked to fill a quasi-legislative 
role with regard to international obligations when a conflicting 
statute is ambiguous, such instances should be limited to occasions 
where the abrogating statute’s text is ambiguous and not expanded 
to include instances where the statute’s text is unambiguous. 
Sometimes, “when a court is faced with two possible constructions 
of the law, and the court is not entirely sure which is correct, it in 
effect has a legislative choice.”128 In this sense, “the court acts as a 
sort of interim legislature, deciding which way the statute should 
operate until the legislature says otherwise.”129 This quasi-legislative 
role of the courts, however, should be strictly limited to situations 
where Congress’s intent is not clearly expressed in the statute’s text. 
If the text of a statute is unambiguous, then the interpreting court 
does not have a legislative role to fill because Congress has already 
done the work for the court. For the court to continue in this 
legislative role despite the presence of unambiguous text is cause for 
serious separation-of-powers concerns. The courts should not 
 
 125.  See Jaffer, supra note 120, at 1098. 
 126.  See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888). 
 127.  Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144–45 (D.D.C. 2002) 
aff’d, 333 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 128.  Rogers, supra note 77, at 640. 
 129.  Id. 
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supplant the legislature in enacting anything other than the words of 
the statute when those words are unambiguous. If the unambiguous 
text leads to a result that Congress did not intend or foresee, it can 
resolve any issues by enacting additional legislation. Indeed, when 
“[t]he language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what 
Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress 
will have to correct.”130 It is certainly not the job of the judiciary to 
protect Congress from itself, especially when doing so interferes with 
separation of powers. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the Charming Betsy canon of construction should be 
predicated on textual ambiguity as the modern precedent applying 
Charming Betsy suggests. When courts apply Charming Betsy to 
textually unambiguous statutes—whether the statute is expressly 
recognized by the court as textually unambiguous or not—three 
major concerns arise. The first concern is that applying Charming 
Betsy to a textually unambiguous statute upsets the precedential 
baseline upon which Congress legislated. If courts wish to change 
course and require a clear statement rule from Congress despite 
textual unambiguity, they should do so only prospectively after they 
have provided the legislature with appropriate notice that there is a 
change in direction going forward. Such notice will give Congress 
the opportunity to take the necessary measures going forward to 
avoid confusion with the courts. 
The second concern that arises from applying Charming Betsy to 
a textually unambiguous statute is that doing so denies ordinary 
citizens fair notice of the law by depriving them of the ability to 
determine a statute’s meaning and to know how the statute applies 
to them. Because of this, courts should limit their use of canons of 
construction generally, and Charming Betsy specifically, to situations 
in which the statute’s text is ambiguous. Fostering fair notice among 
citizens increases citizens’ confidence in the judiciary, which in turn 
promotes individual decisions that benefit society. 
Finally, separation-of-powers concerns arise when Congress is 
required by the courts to include a clear statement in addition to a 
 
 130.  Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 528 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
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textually unambiguous statute to abrogate an international 
agreement. The choice of whether to abrogate an international 
agreement is a choice best left to the political branches of 
government—not the judiciary. Although courts must sometimes fill 
a quasi-legislative role when the text of a statute is ambiguous, 
fulfilling this role is wholly inappropriate when Congress has 
expressed its will through unambiguous statutory text. 
In sum, to determine whether a statute abrogates a conflicting 
treaty or executive agreement, courts should first look to the 
statutory text. If the text provided by the legislature is unambiguous, 
the judiciary’s role is finished, and it should ignore any conflicting 
international agreements or treaties that might exist. If the text is 
ambiguous, only then should the deciding court apply the Charming 
Betsy canon and interpret the statute in a way that is consistent with 
the existing treaties or agreements. 
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